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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers two possible alterations to the current use of Battered Woman 
Syndrome (BWS) as a defense for the criminal act of murder. First, I will argue that BWS 
is best used as an excuse defense for murder. In the United States, BWS has historically 
been used as a justification defense for victims of long-term domestic violence who kill 
their abusers. A justification defense attempts to show that the criminal defendant’s 
action was warranted and justified while an excuse defense is meant to show that the 
criminal defendant is not fully responsible for her actions due to some mental disease or 
defect. I believe that BWS should be used as an excuse defense for murder because there 
is a significant amount of research linking BWS to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) and PTSD is currently accepted as an excuse defense for criminal action. Second, 
I will argue that one way to formulate BWS as an excuse defense is to name BWS in the 
DSM-VI as a sub-category of PTSD. I will also argue that the neural correlates of BWS 
are discoverable and the presentation of neural evidence will support BWS as a genuine 















Lenore Walker first introduced Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) in 1977 to explain 
why women remain in abusive relationships despite repeated abuse (Walker 2009: 41). 
Walker believes that long-term abuse falls into a pattern that is best understood as the 
repetition of a three-stage cycle of violence. In the first stage, the victim becomes aware 
of tension in the abuser. During this stage, the victim attempts to appease the abuser. The 
victim’s effort to calm the abuser is often initially successful, but as tension builds she is 
unable to inhibit the abuser’s hostility. In the second stage, tension continues to escalate 
and the battering incident occurs. The incident typically includes psychological and 
physical abuse. After the battering incident, tension is relieved. Walker believes that the 
release of tension naturally reinforces the abuser’s use of violence. In the third stage, the 
abuser expresses remorse and apologizes profusely for the battering incident. The abuser 
himself may actually believe that he will never allow himself to become violent again. 
This stage provides positive reinforcement for the victim to remain in the relationship 
(Walker 2009: 91-94). As the cycle repeats, the amount of time spent in each stage of the 
cycle decreases and the severity of the battering incident increases. In the most severe 
cases, the victim continually perceives tension in the abuser and the dynamic between the 
abuser and the victim never returns to the third stage of the cycle (Walker 2009: 95).  
Walker believes that women who suffer from BWS get caught in the cycle of 
abuse because they develop learned helplessness. The phrase ‘learned helplessness’ is 
controversial because battered women are actually not helpless at all. They are often able 
to successfully protect their lives and the lives of their children. However, Walker 
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believes that victims of domestic violence must give up their belief that they can escape 
abuse in order to defend themselves. Victims stop believing that their actions will have 
predictable outcomes (Walker 2009: 8-9). So, the victim does not believe that her attempt 
to leave the relationship will have the predictable outcome of ending the abuse. She may 
have to return to the relationship. If the victim does return to the relationship after 
attempting to leave, she will return to a situation that is far worse than the one that she 
left (Walker 2009: 9). Walker’s notion of learned helplessness and how it arises as a 
result of the cycle of violence responds to those who claim that a battered woman can 
easily leave an abusive relationship if she is unhappy with how she has been treated.  
Following its initial presentation, BWS was used as a justification defense for 
sufferers of long-term abuse who, in turn, murdered their abusers. Walker first introduced 
expert testimony on BWS in a Montana case involving Miriam Grieg. Grieg shot and 
killed her abusive husband during a battering incident. After shooting her husband six 
times, Grieg ran out of their apartment. When the police arrived she cautioned them to be 
careful when they entered because her husband was in there and he was angry (Walker 
2009: 346). In addition to explaining the cycle of violence and development of learned 
helplessness, Walker testified that belief in the omnipotence of the abuser is common in 
the battered women she has interviewed (Walker 2009: 346). This is one way that expert 
testimony has been used to support a justification defense for women with BWS.    
Before explaining more about this, it is important to discuss how a defense of this 
type operates in the legal systems of the United States. One purpose of developing a legal 
system is to maintain justice and fairness in a society. The legal system ensures that those 
who violate the law receive appropriate punishment. However, there are instances when a 
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member of society may be justified in her action of killing a fellow human. One such 
instance is when one kills another in self-defense. In the United States, self-defense has a 
specific definition. Definitions of self-defense vary depending on jurisdiction, but most 
include five main criteria, (1) the defendant must be in the presence of imminent danger, 
(2) the defendant must have acted the way that a reasonable person would act, (3) the 
defendant cannot have been the aggressor, (4) the defendant must have used necessary 
and non-excessive force, and (5) the defendant must not have had the opportunity to 
retreat safely (NIJ 1996). These five criteria were put into place to ensure that the defense 
is only used in cases of genuine self-defense.    
I will argue that BWS should be allowed to operate as a defense to murder. 
However, I do not believe that BWS should be a justification defense. Instead, I will 
argue that BWS should be an excuse defense. In addition to justification defenses like 
self-defense, legal systems have historically recognized excuse defenses. Excuse defenses 
are meant to protect the mentally ill. The purpose of an excuse defense is not to show that 
the defendant’s action was justified. Instead, it is to demonstrate that the defendant 
should not be penalized in the same way that a normal functioning human is penalized 
because she harmed another due to her inability to reasonably approach the situation.  
Insanity and unconsciousness are two types of excuse defense. The insanity 
defense is probably the best excuse defense available to a battered woman who kills. 
Different jurisdictions in the United States use different insanity tests, but the main 
purpose of an insanity test is to determine whether or not a person on trial is mentally ill 
and should therefore be excused from their criminal action. About half of the states use 
the M’Naghten Test to access a defendant’s sanity (Burgess 2003: 69). According the 
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M’Naghten Test, a person is only able to use the insanity defense if it can be shown that 
at the time of the offense she could not distinguish right from wrong (Burgess 2003: 69).  
The states that do not use the M’Naghten test use the insanity test developed by the 
American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI test, or ‘Control Test,’ has two components. It 
states that, ‘a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law’ (Model 
Penal Code § 4.01 1962). So, a defendant may be excused if she exhibits just one of the 
two requirements included in the ALI test.  
I believe that BWS can function as an excuse defense to murder because Walker 
has put forth significant research to support her theory that BWS is a subcategory of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD has become one of the most frequently litigated 
mental diseases (Bottalico & Bruni 2012). However, the neuro-correlates of PTSD are 
currently undetermined. This makes legal assessment of the disorder complicated because 
behavioral evidence and the sufferers’ description of experiences is all we have to 
diagnose the condition. Through the use of neuro-technology, a neural basis for PTSD is 
slowly being discovered (Bottalico & Bruni 2012). I believe that neuroscientific progress 
will aid in the legal assessment of PTSD and BWS because neuroscience can offer 
physical evidence for these disorders in addition to the existing behavioral evidence. The 
addition of physical evidence will support BWS as an excuse defense.  
In this paper I will put forth a two pronged argument. First, I will argue that BWS 
has been incorrectly used as a justification defense to murder. Instead, BWS should be 
considered an excuse defense to murder. Second, I will argue that one way to create a 
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BWS excuse defense is to name the syndrome in the DSM-VI as a sub-category of PTSD. 
The neuro-correlates of BWS are discoverable and should be used to support naming 
BWS in the next version of the DSM and to aid in the development of a successful 
excuse defense. I will also consider feminist objections to this view.  
II. BWS: Justification or Excuse Defense?  
Justification and excuse defenses are similar because both defenses relieve the actor of 
liability. The defenses reduce liability because they preclude satisfaction of the basic 
elements of a crime (Greenawalt 1986: 87). In other words, the defenses show that the 
actor did not act in a way that meets the description of the crime in question. For 
example, in the United States first-degree murder is defined as ‘unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice aforethought… perpetrated from a premeditated design 
unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is 
killed’ (18 USC § 1111).  A justification defense would preclude the satisfaction of the 
basic elements of first-degree murder because it would show that the action was 
reasonable and warranted, instead of malicious.  
Self-defense is a possible reason for killing another person. If Bob is at the bar 
drinking with his buddies and a man attempts to stab him to death, Bob is justified if he 
pulls out his knife, fights back, and ultimately stabs his attacker to death. Bob killed a 
human being. However, the only reason that Bob carried out the action was because his 
life was initially threatened. So, self-defense is a justified reason to kill another human 
being.  
Unlike a justification defense, an excuse defense would preclude the satisfaction 
of the basic elements of first-degree murder because the actor is not fully responsible for 
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the unlawful action. Insanity is a possible excuse defense. If Jim shoots and kills his 
neighbor because a low-flying helicopter triggers a PTSD response that he developed 
while fighting in Iraq, Jim could be legally excused from the crime. Jim’s action of 
killing his neighbor was voluntary, but it is clear that Jim suffers from a mental illness 
that distorts his view of reality. For this reason, Jim is not fully responsible for his action.     
Justification and excuse defenses are similar because they both preclude the basic 
elements of a crime, but there are several important differences between justification and 
excuse defenses. One difference is how the defenses relate to the rights of others in 
relation to the action. A justified actor may be aided by others but not prevented by others 
(Greenawalt 1986:89). So, if Bob attempts to successfully defeat his attacker, the violent 
bar patron, his friends would be justified if they came to his aid and attempted to restrain 
the attacker. However, they would not be justified if they took Bob’s knife away, or 
prevented him from protecting himself against the attacker in some other way. Inversely, 
an excused actor may be prevented from acting by others but not aided by others 
(Greenawalt 1986:89). If Wendy finds out that Jim intends to kill his neighbor because he 
thinks that his neighbor is an enemy combatant, she would be justified if she took action 
to stop Jim’s plan. Wendy would not be justified if she agreed to help Jim carry out his 
plan.  
Another difference between justification and excuse defenses is how the defenses 
can be applied to fellow individuals in a society. Justification defenses can be applied to 
anyone in a specific situation (Greenawalt 1986:89). If Sarah had been attacked at the bar 
instead of Bob, Sarah would be justified if she acted in the same way that Bob did. It is 
acceptable for anyone to act in self-defense with the appropriate force. However, excuse 
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defenses are tailored to individual actors (Greenawalt 1986:89). If Wendy decided to kill 
her neighbor and later claimed that she did it because she believed that her neighbor was 
an enemy combatant working in connection with a low-flying helicopter, she would not 
be excused because (unlike Jim) she does not have the history of fighting in Iraq and 
developing PTSD, or similar suffering from similar delusions. 
Greenawalt believes that we will undoubtedly encounter complications when 
trying to make clear distinctions between justification and excuse defenses (Greenawalt 
1986: 87). For example, the DSM-V criteria for PTSD states that the traumatic event in 
question must be beyond the range of usual human experience and the traumatic event 
must generate distress in virtually anyone exposed to it. One might argue that these 
components of the PTSD diagnosis make PTSD a justification defense because it is a 
normal response to an abnormal situation. The development of PTSD does not just 
pertain to an individual; PTSD is a condition that may be developed by anyone who 
undergoes a traumatic event. The development of PTSD may be generalized, but the 
actions of someone who suffers from PTSD cannot be generalized. For this reason, PTSD 
is better used as an excuse defense. A basic understanding of differences between the two 
defenses is helpful as we attempt to move BWS out of the justification defense category 
and into the excuse defense realm.  
Historically, BWS has been used to support the justification defense of self-
defense in murder cases where the victim kills her abuser. BWS was successfully used as 
a justification defense in Stewart v. State (1988). Peggy Stewart was a victim of long-
term abuse who shot and killed her husband while he was sleeping. She plead not guilty, 
claiming that she killed her husband in self-defense. Upon hearing expert testimony about 
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BWS, the jury found Stewart not guilty. However, the decision was appealed. The 
Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that BWS ‘in and of itself does not operate as a defense 
to murder.’ The Court did not believe that Stewart’s situation met the five criteria for 
self-defense. She was not in the presence of imminent danger because she shot her 
husband while he was sleeping. It does not seem as though she acted reasonably. In this 
situation, Stewart was the aggressor. She also used excessive force because her husband 
was neither armed nor conscious. Finally, the Court believed that Stewart had the 
opportunity to retreat safely. The killing carried out by Stewart may have been morally 
justified because she committed the crime to escape abuse. However, the situation is 
different from a legal self-defense case because the abuse that she attempted to escape 
was future abuse, not imminent abuse. Other states followed the lead of the Supreme 
Court of Kansas. 
 Now, BWS cannot be used as a defense to murder in and of itself, but BWS is 
accepted as supporting evidence for self-defense in every jurisdiction of the United States 
(Savage 2006: 764). Expert testimony on BWS may be admitted into evidence in murder 
cases for three different purposes. First, it may be offered to support the defendant’s 
credibility by assisting the jury in analyzing the defendant’s claim of self-defense 
(Savage 2006: 764). The behavior of a battered woman may seem counterintuitive to lay 
people. Someone might assume that if a woman were abused she would leave her abuser 
to protect herself. However, it is clear that in most cases battered women are safer when 
living with the batterer than they would be if they attempted to escape. Signs that the 
relationship is ending often trigger a batterer’s use of deadly violence (Walker 2009: 
350). Second, it may be offered to prove that the defendant honestly believed that she 
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needed to defend herself against imminent or grave bodily injury (Savage 2006: 764). As 
the cycle of violence repeats itself, the severity of violence escalates (Walker 2009: 104). 
Expert testimony helps explain how victims are able to accurately anticipate deadly 
violence and subsequently feel the need to defend themselves. The last purpose for 
offering expert testimony is to show that the defendant’s behavior was reasonable 
(Savage 2006: 764). The definition of ‘reasonable’ has been an area of disagreement 
among philosophers and legal scholars. What seems reasonable to one group of people 
may seem unreasonable to another due to social differences. For example, a person who 
has not been exposed to domestic violence may not understand the difficulty of breaking 
the cycle of violence. They may think that killing an abuser when there is no imminent 
threat to one’s life is unreasonable because killing is a more severe crime than abuse. 
However, killing an abuser may seem reasonable to someone who understands BWS and 
the cycle of violence (Walker 2009: 348).    
In order for a defense of self-defense to be successfully used the jury must be 
convinced that the victim meets all five criteria for self-defense. Expert testimony might 
help to persuade the jury into believing that the victim meets some of these criteria, but it 
is difficult to show that she meets all of the criteria. Reasonableness is perhaps the 
biggest hurdle for a BWS sufferer to overcome when attempting to use the defense of 
self-defense. The action is clearly unreasonable when background information about the 
abusive relationship is not considered. The scenario of Bob the justified killer is different 
from the situation of a victim of BWS who kills her abuser. It is difficult to convince a 
jury that the battered woman was not the aggressor if she killed the abuser while he was 
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in a vulnerable position. The actions of a woman who suffers from BWS do not fit 
cleanly into the criteria for the defense of self-defense.     
For these reasons, I do not believe that a justification defense is the best approach 
to protecting victims of domestic violence who kill. One might argue that the best way to 
resolve this problem is to amend the defense of self-defense to fix problems surrounding 
reasonableness and include responses to prolonged abuse as a form of self-defense. As I 
will argue below, this approach would not acknowledge the role that the psychological 
condition of the victim plays in her decision to murder her abuser.  
III. Recognizing BWS as a Genuine Psychological Condition 
Walker has spent most of her career collecting empirical support for BWS. Her most 
recent study began in 2003. The study consisted of administering a revised version of the 
Battered Woman Syndrome Questionnaire. The BWSQ #2 was developed to eliminate 
variables in the BWSQ #1 that did not accurately discriminate those with BWS. 
Standardized tests and other assessment instruments are included in the BWSQ #2 
(Walker 2009: 51). One of the assessments in the BWSQ #2 determines whether or not 
women report symptoms included in the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The BWSQ #2 was 
administered in the United States, Greece, Russia, and Spain. (Walker 2009: 52). Walker 
does not believe that every abused woman will develop BWS. She also does not believe 
that every abused woman will develop PTSD. However, each of the four cross-national 
groups of women that were studied scored above the required criteria for diagnosis of 
PTSD (Walker 2009: 57). The results and analysis of Walker’s BSWQ #2 is the first 
empirical evidence to support the link between BWS and PTSD.   
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Similar to BWS, PTSD was not initially accepted as a genuine mental condition. 
Commentators disagree about the first time that PTSD was observed in trauma survivors. 
Some claim that the first modern descriptions of PTSD were offered during the period of 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) (Merskey & Piper 2007). In this war, high-
explosive shells were used for the first time. Reports of those who survived the war 
describe a condition called ‘traumatic war neurosis.’ Traumatic war neurosis was 
characterized by confused states of mind, brief excitement and irritability, fearfulness, 
and general emotional instability (Botallico and Bruni 2012: 113). Traumatic war 
neurosis was later observed in veterans of the First and Second World Wars. Folk 
psychological terms like ‘shell shock’ and claims that a man had ‘lost his nerve’ were 
used to describe veterans who exhibited traumatic war neurosis (Botallico and Bruni 
2007: 113).  
 Despite accounts of PTSD from as early as the turn of the 20th Century, PTSD did 
not become recognized as an independent disease until after the Vietnam War. Vietnam 
veterans lobbied the DSM task force to include PTSD as a disease in DSM-III (Burgess 
et al. 2010). The veterans were successful and PTSD was included in DSM-III. Upon its 
recognition as an independent disease, it became clear that PTSD was present in the 
general population. DSM-IV broadened the definition of PTSD to include more traumatic 
stressors. DSM-IV lists the core features of PTSD as (1) a traumatic event that involved 
actual or threatened death or serious injury, or threat to the physical integrity of self and 
others, resulting in a person’s responding with fear, feelings of helplessness, or horror; 
(2) the re-experiencing of the trauma in nightmares, intrusive thoughts (flashbacks), (3) 
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the numbing of responsiveness, or avoidance of thoughts or acts related to the trauma, (4) 
symptoms of dysphoria and hyperarousal (DSM-IV).1 
 The method for assessing PTSD in DSM-IV is behavioral. However, 
neuroscientists are successfully building tests to distinguish actual PTSD patients from 
non-patients using neuroimaging techniques. Neuroimaging uses three main techniques – 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Positron Emission Tomography (PET), 
and Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) (Fancati, Vermetten, & 
Bremner 2007). All three techniques measure signals that are related to variations in 
regional Cerebral Blood Flow (rCBF). Basically, when a specific region of the brain is 
more active than a baseline, the region consumes more energy. More energy requires 
more blood. The correlation between rCBF and brain activity, or the firing of action 
potentials, is not perfect, but the correlation is strong enough to draw conclusions about 
brain activity (Logothetis 2008).  The fMRI is widely available in hospitals because the 
scanner is the same machine used for conventional structural MRIs. Also, the fMRI does 
not require contact with radiation and it is non-invasive (Botallico and Bruni 2012: 113). 
For these reasons, the fMRI has become the leading neuroimaging technique in recent 
years.    
 The use of fMRIs has aided researchers in their attempts to find physical evidence 
to support behavioral evidence for PTSD. Recently, progress has been made toward 
                                                
1 The DSM-5 is due for publication in May 2013. There have been several proposed 
changes for the diagnosis and criteria of PTSD. The symptoms of PTSD will remain the 
same for the most part. The diagnosis of PTSD may be moved from the category of 
anxiety disorders to a new class of ‘trauma and stressor-related disorders.’ The 
assessment measures for PTSD are also being revised (U.S. Department of Veteran’s 
Affairs 2012).   
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discovering physical evidence. Neuroscientists have found that in patients with PTSD the 
rCBF in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC) is significantly lower relative to healthy 
patients (Liberzon & Sripada 2008). This finding is significant because the MPFC and 
amygdala systematically work together to regulate fear. The process used to regulate fear 
is top-down. The amygdala recognizes dangerous stimuli and the MPFC, specifically the 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), stops the fear response when the threatening situation 
has passed, or is no longer frightening. In addition to differences in the way that the 
MPFC operates in PTSD patients and healthy patients, neuroscientists have found 
differences in the activity of the amygdala. The rCBF in the amygdala of PTSD patients 
is greater in PTSD patients relative to healthy patients (Shin 2004). The main conclusion 
that has been drawn from recent fMRI research is that PTSD symptoms are the result of 
loss of regulation of the amygdala-MPFC system (Bottalico and Bruni 2012: 114).  
Unfortunately, this theory of PTSD may have some problems. Van Wingen and 
his colleagues have found that the heightened amygdala response that has been linked 
with PTSD is not specific to this disease. A similar result was produced in healthy 
subjects who underwent severe and repeated stress (Van Wingen et al. 2011). This 
finding shows that it is somewhat easy for the amygdala-MPFC system to be affected by 
exposure to stress. However, some have argued that this observation supports the 
hypothesis that PTSD patients experience continual stress due to their inability to regulate 
fear responses (Botallico and Bruni 2012: 114).  
In addition to empirical support put forth by fMRI studies, a new neuroimaging 
technique has been used in the search for a physical explanation of PTSD. Georgopoulos 
and his colleagues developed a technique that measures Synchronous Neural Interactions 
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(SNI). They believe that SNI can successfully reveal biomarkers for several different 
pathologies. SNI attempts to track ‘synchronization patterns across the cortex, examining 
how different neuronal ensembles modulate their activity over time as well as relative to 
other ensembles’ (Botallico & Bruni 2012: 115, Georgopoulos et al. 2007). So, SNI 
examines the way that different neural networks work together.  
Georgopoulos and his colleagues were able to use SNI and a sophisticated 
statistical procedure to create predictors that successfully classified PTSD patients and 
healthy controls with an accuracy of 97.3% and a specificity of 87.6% (Georgopoulos et 
al. 2010). They found that differences in synchronous activity between veterans who 
suffered from PTSD and healthy patients were localized in the right temporal cortex. 
Georgopoulos and his colleagues believe that flashbacks and continual re-experiencing of 
the traumatic memory associated with PTSD are connected to this marker. Georgopoulos 
claims that more work need to be done to develop a clear picture of what is going on in 
the brain of an individual who suffers from PTSD (Georgopoulos et al. 2010). 
Specifically, studies need to be conducted on other PTSD groups such as non-veteran 
adults and children. 
I believe that battered women should be considered a PTSD group that is eligible 
to participate in SNI studies. Neuroscientific studies of this kind have not yet been 
conducted on those who meet Walker’s BWS criteria. If battered women exhibit the same 
SNI marker as veterans who suffer from PTSD, this data would support Walker’s theory 
that BWS is a sub-category of PTSD. With neuroscientific evidence, I believe that it 
would be easier to make the case that BWS should be named as a sub-category of PTSD 
in the next version of the DSM. Battered women would greatly benefit from the 
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recognition of BWS as a genuine psychological condition. Among other things, this 
recognition would aid in introducing BWS as an excuse defense. 
There is empirical evidence to support the notion that introducing BWS as a 
subcategory of PTSD will successfully help victims of domestic violence to formulate an 
excuse defense.  Cheryl Terrance and Kimberly Matheson conducted an experiment in 
which they attempted to determine whether or not the inclusion of PTSD expert 
testimony would make a woman who suffered from BWS more likely to successfully use 
the defense of self-defense. In order for a defense of self-defense to be successful, the 
jury has to believe that the victim acted reasonably. Terrance and Matheson aimed to 
figure out whether or not inclusion of PTSD evidence would make the victim appear 
more or less reasonable. First year undergraduate psychology majors (143 males and 173 
females) volunteered to participate in the study in return for course credit. Juries 
consisted of 4 to 8 jurors and included at least one juror of the opposite sex. The 
experimental juries were shown one of three different videotaped cases. In one group of 
cases BWS expert testimony was put forth to support a defense of self-defense. In 
another group of cases BWS expert testimony framed within PTSD was presented to 
support a defense of self-defense. The last group of cases was the control group; no BWS 
expert testimony was presented (Terrance and Matheson 2003).  
The juries’ reaction to the videotaped cases showed that expert testimony that 
framed BWS within PTSD lead the jurors to feel more sympathetic toward the victim 
who had murdered her abuser. The jurors believed that the BWS/PTSD formulation of 
the defense represented a more valid psychological diagnosis than the jurors who were 
only given BWS evidence. Terrance and Matheson believe that an ‘aura of scientific 
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objectivity’ may have been afforded to the PTSD evidence due to its inclusion in the 
DSM-IV. Also, the jurors who were given the BWS/PTSD evidence were more likely to 
believe that the circumstances that the woman on trial experienced resulted in her 
becoming insane (Terrance and Matheson 2003). Therefore, the PTSD evidence 
increased the juries’ awareness of the extent to which the battered woman developed an 
actual psychological disorder.    
 Although there was a difference in the way that the BWS/PTSD juries and the 
BWS juries viewed the battered woman on trial, the verdicts for both cases came back the 
same. The juries’ verdicts were overwhelmingly guilty. The BWS and BWS/PTSD juries 
were not persuaded to view the actions of the battered woman as justified from the 
perspective of a ‘reasonable person.’ Terrance and Matheson conclude that PTSD 
evidence may be more useful to support an insanity plea (Terrance and Matheson 2003).  
 Examination of case law reveals that PTSD has had mixed results when used as a 
criminal defense (State v. Heads (1981); People v. Wood (1982); State v. Gregory (1979); 
New Jersey v. Cocuzza (1981)). However, courts often treat expert testimony on PTSD as 
scientifically reliable. PTSD is accepted in the United States appellate courts as a valid 
basis for the excuse defenses of insanity and unconsciousness. I believe that the insanity 
defense is the only excuse defense available to a battered woman who kills. Depending 
on the jurisdiction, the M’Naghten test or ALI test may be used.  
I believe that if the M’Naghten test is used, one could argue that the BWS victim 
could not distinguish right from wrong when she killed her abusive intimate partner. The 
cycle of violence and learned helplessness support this argument by showing that a 
victim of long-term abuse loses the ability to accurately predict the outcome of her 
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actions. If the ALI test is used, it could be argued that the BWS victim could not conform 
her conduct to the requirements of the law. The cycle of violence and learned 
helplessness support this argument by showing that the victim genuinely believed that 
killing her partner was the only way to escape abuse. The possible legal consequences of 
the action did not prevent her from carrying out the action.  
The unconsciousness defense is based upon the requirement that a criminal act 
must be involuntary. Basically, the law states that an individual who commits a crime 
while unconscious cannot be said to have voluntarily committed the act (Burgess 2003: 
71). Currently accepted involuntary acts include ‘reflexes, convulsions, movements 
during sleep, conduct under hypnosis, and a bodily movement that otherwise is not a 
product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual’ (Model 
Penal Code § 2.01 1962). The actions of a battered woman who kills do not fit into any of 
the categories of currently accepted involuntary acts. I do not believe BWS will ever be 
included as an unconscious defense because the women in BWS cases are clearly 
conscious. Perhaps a BWS sufferer who killed her abuser while sleepwalking could 
successfully use an unconscious defense. However, in this hypothetical example, 
sleepwalking has become the disorder in question, not BWS.  
The expert testimony available to those who suffer from BWS is better suited for 
an excuse defense. An excuse defense to murder for those with BWS would be supported 
by expert testimony on the connection between PTSD and BWS along with neuro-
evidence indicating that long-term abuse physically alters the way that the brain of a 
BWS victim functions.  
IV. Feminist Objections 
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Following the civil rights movement in the 1970’s, women began to demand equality 
under the law in the United States. Early feminist legal approaches adopted an 
Aristotelian view of equality to argue for a gender-neutral legal system (Mackinnon 
1991: 1286). Simply put, the Aristotelian notion of equality states that things that are 
alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in 
proportion to their unlikeness (Nicomachean Ethics 1131a-b). So, early feminists argued 
that equality meant applying laws that were traditionally only applied to men to women 
as well. Inequality meant not applying laws in a uniform manner. Special legal 
protections for women were to be avoided. Pregnancy, insurance, women’s schools, 
women’s prisons, and other issues that brought to light important differences between the 
sexes were treated as rare exceptions that could be handled using some other rubric 
(Mackinnon 1991: 1287). Feminists who subscribe to this early approach to achieving 
legal equality will certainly take issue with the BWS project that I have outlined because 
it attempts to establish a female-specific mental disorder and accompanying female-
specific legal defense.  
 Although early feminists may object to recognizing BWS as a female-specific 
mental condition and legal defense, I believe that there are other formulations of 
feminism that might support this project. Catherine Mackinnon is a contemporary 
feminist who has challenged the Aristotelian rationale used by early feminists. She claims 
that the major mistake of this approach is its failure to recognize the content of equality, 
or the way that the standard of equality is created. She writes,  
Why should anyone have to be like white men to get what they have, given that 
white men do not have to be like anyone except each other to have it? Since men 
have defined women as different to the extent they are female, can women be 
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entitled to equal treatment only to the extent they are not women? (Mackinnon 
1991: 1287). 
 
Mackinnon believes that when the early feminist approach is closely considered, it 
becomes clear that it harms women more than it helps them because it requires them to 
conform to the characteristics of white men. Mackinnon believes that instead of creating 
equality, this practice robs women of their female identity. She also points out that it is 
absurd to use Aristotle’s theory as a basis for equality as Aristotle lived in a slave society 
that did not afford any rights to women (Mackinnon 1991: 1287). Mackinnon argues that 
there are important differences between men and women and these differences can be 
acknowledged without hindering equality. Mackinnon’s feminist theory represents one 
way that the view that I have put forth can work to promote equality while still 
recognizing differences between men and women.2   
V. Conclusion 
BWS has historically been used as a justification defense for sufferers of long-term abuse 
who subsequently murder their abusers. Currently, BWS is not allowed to serve as a 
defense to murder in and of itself. Instead, it is allowed to serve as supporting evidence 
for a justification defense. I believe that BWS is better suited to be used as an excuse 
defense. Walker has shown that those who suffer from BWS also exhibit the symptoms 
of PTSD and PTSD is commonly used as an excuse defense to murder. I believe that 
inclusion of BWS is the DSM and admission of neuro-evidence to show that the female 
                                                
2 I am open to the possibility that men who are victims of long-term domestic violence 
may develop BWS. However, cases of domestic violence that involve male victimization 
are rarely reported. The lack of data on male victimization is a major obstacle when 
attempting to determine whether or not men and women respond to domestic violence in 
the same way.    
                                                                                      Wiley, Krista J. 2013, UMSL, p. 22 
victim’s brain has been physically altered due to repeated abuse will aid in creating a 
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